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I
INTRODUCTION
This matter has been remanded by the Court of Appeals
with instructions that this Court "conduct further proceedings
in order to etermine the appropriate relief." Hopkins v
Price Waterhouse. 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir, 1987). Because
it is not clear from the Court of Appeals decision what
"further proceedings" should be conducte , this Court has asked
the parties to provide guidance concerning that issue, This
memorandum responds to the Court's request, sets forth the
reasons hy, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
only "appropriate "further proceedings" must be a trial on all
aspects of the remedial ortion of this Title VII case, and
ex lains why plaintiff is entitled neither to admission to
artnership in efendant nor damages calculated on the basis of
admission to partnership.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DETERMINE THE NATURE OF
THE RELIEF TO WHICH PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
The Court of Appeals affir ed this Court's fin ing in
plaintiff's favor on liability an

overturned this Court's

conclusion that plaintiff had not been constructively
discharged. However, the Court of Appeals id not otherwise
purport to resolve any aspect of the remedial phase of this
litigation. Indeed, while the Court of Appeals ecision is not
altogether free of a biguity, that Court could not have decided

the remedial segment of plaintiff's case because the Court of
Appeals found that, "without the knowledge or consent of the
[District] Court," the parties had "attempted to bifurcate the
trial and postpone consi eration of the issue of damages."
825 F.2d at 472. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had no
choice but to remand the case to this Court for "further
procee ings" which would, in turn, allow this Court to
" eter ine the a pro riate relief." Id¦ at 473. In essence,

although sympathetic to the inconv nience to the District Court
caused by the arties' unsanctioned effort to bifurcate, the
Court of Appeals apparently determined that the evidence which
plaintiff had refrained from presenting regarding remedial
issues at the first trial coul and should be offere at a
remedial phase trial on remand. It follows as a matter of
logic, fairness an due process, that defendant shoul
similarl be permitted at the remedial phase trial to put on
all of its evidence regarding any issue relevant to remedy.

Ill
LI BILITY ND REMEDY ARE DISCREET SEGMENTS
OF TITLE VII LITIGATION
The Court of Ap eals for this Circuit has deter ine
that "a plaintiff whose ri ht to protection from discrimination
has been violated still may be denie a full remedy." Milton
v. Weinber er, 696 F.2d 94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court's

e phasis) (citing S ith v. Secretary of Navy. 659 F.2d 1113,
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1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Thus, the Court of Appeals has
recently observed, "in Title VII cases 'the questions of
statutory violation and appropriate statutory reme y are
conceptually distinct.'" Johnson v, Brock. 810 F.2

219, 223

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Smith v. Secretary of Navy, supra. at

1120).
The remedial phase of a Title VII case is an
essentially equitable procee ing. As the Supreme Court has
observe , in a Title VII case there a re no:

"automatic or man atory remed[ies] ....

The [statutory] scheme i plicitly recognizes
that there may be cases calling for one
re edy but not another, and , . . these

choices are of course, left in the first
instance to the istrict courts."

Albermarle Paper Co pany v. Moody, 422 U.5. 405, 415-416

(1974) .
In commenting on the equitable considerations that may
inform the trial court in formulating relief, the Supreme Court
has observed that:

Especially when im ediate imple entation of
an equitable re ed threatens to impinge
upon the e pectations of innocent parties,
the court ust "look to the practical
realities and necessities inescapably
involved in reconciling competing
interests," in order to determine the
"special blend of what is necessary, what is
fair, and what is workable."

International Brotherhood of Tea sters v. United States, 431
U.S. 325, 375 (1977) (citations omitted).

3 -

Where a plainti££ .has established that an em loyment
decision has been affecte in some manner by prohibite
iscrimination, as has been determine here, the employer may
nonetheless avoid the reme ies o£ back-pay an instatement by
emonstrating with clear an convincing evi ence in the
reme ial phase of the case that the promotion ecision woul
have been the same even absent iscrimination, Johnson
Brock, SUEra. St 224 (citing Daz JathewS. 530 F.2 1083,
1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). In fact, the clear an convincing
proof require ent of Day comes into play only aft r the
a.

•

ai-utorv violation." JQhnson_v

laintiff has established a statutory vxu.|.a
Brock, idj.

as these authorities emonstrate, the reme ial phase
of a Title VII case properly inclu es consideration of all
evidence and argument on any issue, inclu ing whether the
employment ecision woul have been the same absent any
prohibited iscrimination, relevant to "what is necessary, what
is fair, and

hat is workable." IntlLrnaUonalJr

T msters v. United_States, supra, at 375,

IV

WHTCH MAY BE HAD IN_THIS_CASE
hile the precise parameters of the bifurcatron
intended by the parties were never reduced to writing and
submitte to this Cour , the only reasonable, fair an
practicable course from this point is to proceed with a full
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trial of all remedial phase issues Such an approach is
consistent ith the manner in which the parties proceede in
the previous trial. While the references by counsel during the
previous trial were not unifor regarding t e scope an nature
of the intende bifurcation, plaintiff's counsel characterize
the agreement as bifurcation of the questions of re edy and
relief :

MR. HELLER I
We informally agree to bifurcate he case,
your honor, so you did not hear some of he
economic facts ....
* 4c * A

We simply have not gone into the question of
remed

....

Transcript, May 29, 1985, at p. 25
We were not getting into the question of
remedy and relief ....
Id. at 27.

The trial recor , taken as a whole, reflects that
plaintiff presented her case as if the entire remedial phase
was being

eferred, offerin

no evi ence or argument on any

reme ial issue. Defen an , of course, responded to plaintiff's
case on liability, but did no attempt to respond to a
non-existent plain iff's case on reme ial issues.

Unfortunately, the parties' informal and un ritten
understan ing regarding this proce ure was not submitted for
the trial court s approval, bu that does not alter the
fundamental fact that there has been a trial on liability, but
not on remedies.

5

The briefs of the plaintiff at the Court of Appeals
observed that the trial below had focused only on the issue of
liability." Orig. Br. for Appellant-Cross Appellee at 20; Rep.
Br. for Appellant-Cross Appellee at 37. In fact, the only
reference to reme ial issues in the briefs submitted to the
trial court is the statemen in note 1 of Defen ant's
Post-Trial Brief that plaintiff's failure to establish a
constructive disc arge claim would cut off her reme ial
rights. Significantly, plaintiff respon e

to that footnote by

accusing Pr ce Waterhouse of inviting the "Court to
preju ge . . . the relief to be given plaintiff . . . ."

Plaintiff's [Post-Trial] Rep. Br. at 10 n.l. Plaintiff s
reaction, of course, was. entirely consistent with her co nsel's

re resentation to the Court during ost-trial arguments that
the parties hadjagreed "not to [get] into the question of
reme y an
a

relief . . . .

(Transcript of Post-Trial Argument

26-27).

Price Waterhouse acknowledges that this Court
previously foc se on some aspects of certain issues which
overlap with considerations relevant to the'remedial phase of
this litigation, including the question whether the defendant
woul have " eld plaintiffs partnership can i acy absent any
unconscious se

stereoty ing. However, the Court

id so

despite the fact that neither party at empted to present
evidence on t e reme ial phase issues because of their working
presumption concerning the bifurcation of liability an
remedy. While this Cour

ay well be justifiably disturbed by
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the

rospect of revisiting territory already partially

travelle , thereby implicitly giving effect to the unsanctioned
agreement between the parties, that seems o be the only
reasonable course given the decision by and the directions from
the Court of Appeals. Any other approach would be unfair to
one or the other of the arties.
Plaintiff may contend that previous consideration by
this Court of matters relevant to remedial issues requires that
those mat ers be foreclose from further inquiry. Ho ever,
plaintiff un oubtedly intends to offer evidence and argument on
all aspec s of the remedies which she seeks, hether or not
consi ered previously by the Court. It would be unfair and
unjust for his Court to treat plaintiff as having reserved
entirely her evidence and argument as to reme ial issues an
yet preclu e Ppice Waterhouse fro offering any evidence which
it may have to any reme y sought by plaintiff.
The importance to the efendant of having the
opportunity to present evidence on all relevant reme ial
issues, inclu ing whe her its decision "holding" plaintiff
would have been the sa e absent any alleged sex s ereotyping,
is underscored y the anner and timing of the intro uction of
that theory in this case by plaintiff. That theory was not
i entifie

before trial in plaintiff's discovery responses,

despite a clear request that she i entify the bases an facts
upon which she asserte her claim of sex iscrimination.
Indeed, the se stereo ype theory and plaintiff s e pert on

7

that theory ere not identifie until eleven days before trial,
after the close of discovery, and the expert was not made
available for deposition. Neither the sex stereo ype theory
nor the plai tiff's expert was even even introduced into his
case until after plaintiff had completed her case-in-chief an
the defendant had respon e to it. The theory was then
introduce (over efendant's objection, Transcript at 539) as
supposed rebuttal. Under these circumstances, in the conte t
of the agree -upon bifurcation, efen ant had no appropriate
opportunity in the liabilit phase trial to present the "same
ecision" defense.

In summary, because of the unique circumstances
present in this case, as a result of the unwritten and
unsanctioned bifurcation agreement which precluded the full an
orderly presentation of evidence regarding remedial issues, and
in light of the - ecision of the Court of Ap eals to re-open the
remedial phase of this case to enable plaintiff to offer
evidence not presente before, the only just and fair proce ure
to pursue now is a full an complete trial of all remedial
issues.

V
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
A PRICE WATERHOUSE PARTNERSHIP
Irrespective of the outcome of the "same decision"
efense in the remedial phase of this trial, plaintiff is not
entitled to an or er that Price Waterhouse make her a partner.

8 -

Such an order would constitute an extraordinary reme y, well
beyond the creation of a simple employment relationship. It
would directly, substantially an intimately affect the
interests of individuals who plainly di not discriminate
against plaintiff. It would be particularly inappropriate to
force Price Waterhouse par ners to acce t plaintiff into a
professional and collegial partnership relations ip under the
circumstances of this case. As this Court expressly foun ,
Price Waterhouse had strong and legitimate non-pretex ua1
reasons not to bind their future and share unlimited

liabilities with the

laintiff.

Inability to get along with staff or peers
is a legitimate, non iscriminatory reason
for refusing to a mit a candidate for
partnership.

j
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse. 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C.

1985) .
Under the circu stances, this Court, in the exercise
of its equitable discretion, shoul

not force plaintiff into

defen ant s partnership.
Plaintiff's Memorandum on Relief mistakenly assumes
that because liability has been established in her favor, she
as a legal entitlement to certain remedies, including back pay
and a mission to the Price Waterhouse partnership. However, as
noted earlier, this Court must exercise equitable powers hen
selecting a remed an no remedy is auto atic. The obligation
imposed on this Court by Title VII is to exercise judgment an

9

discretion, to consider "what is necessary, what is fair, and
what is workable" (International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, supra, at 375), and to administer justice.
This Cour 's responsibility certainly oes not extend
beyond placing plaintiff in the position she would ave been in
ha impermissible ingre ients not seepe into the unconscious
hemispheres of the partnership candi acy process. The fin ings
of the Court establish no more than that if that process had
been entirely free of sex stereotyping, plaintiff would have
been in the position of a candidate evaluated without regar to
her sex. That is the most favorable position to which she may
be restored by any remedial or er of this Court. Plaintiff is
not entitle to be place in a more favorable position than she
would have occupied absent the "taint" of sex stereotyping. In
fact. Title VII, specifically provides that a plaintiff cannot
rely upon mere proof of some undefined "taint" in a multi-stage
decision process to achieve a more favorable position than she
woul have been in had there been no taint of iscrimination.
See, e.g,, Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc). See also Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
In similar cases, in which a laintiff has been held
to ha e established that discrimination had some elusive an
unquantifiable connection with a promotion decision, but he
employer had also establishe legiti ate reasons to question

- 10

the qualification of the plaintiff for the promotion in
question, the plaintiff has been given no more than
reconsideration for the romotion in a nondiscriminatory
selection process. As in the instant case, many of these cases

have involved multi-stage decisional processes and promotions
which inclu e elements of tenure. See Gurmankin v, Costanzo.

626 F.2d 1115 (3r Cir. 1980); Pvo v. Stockton State College.
603 F. Sup . 1278 (D.N.J. 1985); Gemmel1 v. Meese. 655 F. Supp.
577 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Fields v. Clark University. 40 Fair E pl.
Prac. Gas. 670 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir.
1987) . See also Darnell v. City of Jasper. 730 F,2d 653, 656

(11th Cir. 1984) (successful plaintiff entitled to take test
unlawfully enied, but not to instatement to position).
The situation here is similar to the circu stances of
the foregoing gases. Plaintiff has establis e no more than
that an impermissible element played an unquantified and
clearly not

ispositive role in a multi-step (multiple

evaluator) promotion selection process. The Court found that
many of the partners participating in that process offered
legiti ate non iscriminatory reasons why the plaintiff should
not receive the promotion she sought. This Court ex ressed
serious concern as to plaintiff * s interpersonal behavior and
thus her qualifica ion for the pro otion. This Court di not
find that laintiff "woul have been elected to partnership if
the Policy Boar 's decision ha not been tainted by se ually
biase evaluations." 618 F. Supp. at 1120. Under the
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circumstances, plaintiff can properly hope to recover nothing
more than an untainted" evaluation of her partnership merits.
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 476 U.S. 69 (1984), he
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in these types of cases is
simply entitled to be considered for partnership on
non iscriminatory bases. The Court did not hold that Title VII
rovides a plaintiff

ith a right to be admitted

o an

participate in a partnershi . Under the circumstances, an
order by this Court directing that Price Waterhouse admit
laintiff to the partnership would go beyond the scope of the
Hishon ecision.

VI
IF THE COURT WERE INCLINED TO ORDER RELIEF BEYOND
RECONSIDERATION. FRONT PAY WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE
THAN AN ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF'S ADMISSION
TO THE PARTNERSHIP
Even if this Court were inclined to or er relief
beyond reconsideration for artnershi , it must confront the
issue of w ether front pay would be a more appropriate form of
relief than an order that plaintiff be a mitte

to the

partnershi . In light of the rights of the partners of Price
Waterhouse to exclude from the partnership persons like t e
laintiff, who are unable to fu ction well with employees and
colleagues, and who have engendere antagonism and hostility, a
damage remedy is vastly preferable to an enforced partnership.
See, e.a.. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724 (2nd

Cir. 1984).
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VII
THIS COURT MUST CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO MITIGATE
DAMAGES IN FASHIONING ANY ECONOMIC AWARD
I fashioning any award of back or front pay, this
Court ill need to consider plaintiff's obligation to mitigate
damages and the evidence which defendant offers on that issue.
Discovery will be necessary on this matter and Price Waterhouse
intends to a dress the question whether plaintiff could have
substantially mitigated, if not eliminated, any amages or loss
of pay she claims. In that regard, the Court will be asked to
consider whether the plaintiff's actions following the "hol "
decision, especially as her con uct affected the
nondiscrirninator

ecision not to repropose her for

partnership, were inconsistent with her obligation to mitigate
amages. The Cpurt will be aske to consi er whether
plaintiff's actions in attempting to intimidate a partner of
her office were inconsistent with that obligation and were a
factor in er not being reproposed by Office of Go ernment
Services. (Transcript of Trial at 387-89, 401, 411, 724;
Transcript of Post-Trial Argument at 49-50).

VIII
CONCLUSION
This case is unusual because this Court previously
determined to render its judgment based upon a trial record
which did not inclu e evi ence on remedial issues, withhel by
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ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On February 1, 1988, a copy of the Defendant's
Memorandum On Issues For Reme ial Phase Trial was hand

delivere to Douglas E. Huron, Esq., Kator, Scott & Heller,
1029 Vermont Avenue,

Attorneys for Plaint
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